Recent rulings clarify that refusals under section 119(2)(b) are administrative, leaving taxpayers with limited avenues for appeal, primarily through writ petitions for arbitrary or unsupported decisions.
A rejection under section 119(2)(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 can leave taxpayers facing a frustrating procedural dead end, but the law is much narrower than many assume. The provision exists to let the tax authorities admit belated claims, returns or refund requests where refusing relief would cause genuine hardship. Yet, as several recent rulings and case summaries show, a refusal under this section is generally not an appealable order before either the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
That point was made clearly by the Gujarat High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rasida Ibrahimbhai Vohra, which treated an order under section 119(2)(b) as administrative rather than appellate in character. Because of that, the court held that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear an appeal against such a refusal. TaxHeal’s summary of a later ITAT matter reaches the same practical conclusion: where the dispute is only over the condonation request itself, the Tribunal cannot be used as the forum of challenge.
The distinction matters because a taxpayer may still have an appealable assessment order on the substantive tax issue, even if the earlier condonation plea fails. But the rejection of the delay-condonation application does not, by itself, create a right of appeal. That is why practitioners need to identify the exact order being challenged before choosing a forum; mixing up the administrative refusal with a later assessment can lead to dismissal at the threshold.
Where the refusal is said to be arbitrary, mechanical or unsupported by reasons, the more realistic remedy is usually a writ petition before the jurisdictional High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. LiveLaw’s report on a Gujarat High Court ruling notes that applications under section 119(2)(b) cannot be rejected on vague or arbitrary grounds. A separate case summary on TaxTMI also shows the courts insisting on a proper hearing and a reasoned order before such discretion is exercised.
Recent High Court decisions also show that success depends on the quality of the taxpayer’s explanation. The Bombay High Court, in Ravi Madhusudan Mehta, intervened where the rejection appeared mechanical and the assessee had documented personal and medical difficulties affecting compliance. But the Delhi High Court later upheld a refusal in Manjit Singh Dhaliwal, underlining that genuine hardship must be established on facts and that mere delay, inadvertence or neglect is not enough.
The practical lesson is straightforward: a section 119(2)(b) application must be prepared as a full factual case, not as a bare plea for sympathy. It should explain what prevented timely filing, why the cause was beyond the taxpayer’s control, when the problem ended, how quickly action followed and what concrete tax claim is at stake. For pending and future matters, taxpayers and advisers should also verify the corresponding provision under the Income-tax Act, 2025, which has reorganised parts of the delay-condonation framework.
Disclaimer: This article is intended to inform and educate, not to recommend or endorse any financial product, investment or strategy. Please consider your own financial circumstances and seek professional advice where appropriate before making financial decisions.
